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UNDER CONTAINMENT: PREEMPTING STATE EBOLA 
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS 
Eang L. Ngov* 
The outbreak of Ebola in Africa and its recent emergence in America has 
brought to light that the ambit of state sovereignty in the face of federal policy is 
unsettled in the public health field. Quarantine laws have historically been 
recognized as an exercise of state police powers and, absent discriminatory uses, 
courts have afforded much deference to states when the federal government is 
dormant. 
This Article explores federalism implications when federal and state 
sovereigns contest the purview of regulating Ebola, other epidemics, and 
quarantines. This Article examines how the federal government could assert 
supremacy to regulate the treatment of epidemics and quarantine through 
preemption, in light of traditionally recognized state police powers over health and 
safety, and evaluates the value of federal and state sovereignty over such matters. It 
argues that the anti-preemption clause of the Public Health Service Act, which 
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governs federal authority over quarantines and communicable diseases, and the 
Supreme Court’s general presumption against preemption would not save state 
quarantine regulations from preemption. It concludes that preemption doctrines, 
particularly obstacle and field preemption, could override state quarantine 
regulations because state law arguably threatens national security by frustrating 
federal efforts to contain Ebola in West Africa and impeding the Executive’s 
exercise of his foreign affairs power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ebola emerged1 on U.S. soil when the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) confirmed on September 30, 2014 that Thomas Eric Duncan 
was the first person to be diagnosed with Ebola in the United States.2 Ebola is a 
 
1.  Ebola first arrived in the United States in 1989, when laboratory monkeys tested positive for 
Ebola. Paul E. Kilgore, John D. Grabenstein, Abdulbaset M. Salim & Michael Ryabak, Treatment of 
Ebola Virus Disease, 35 PHARMACOTHERAPY: J. HUM. PHARMACOLOGY & DRUG THERAPY 43, 44 
(2015); Alison Bruzek, Ebola in the United States: What Happened When, NPR (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/10/15/356098903/ebola-in-the-united-states-what-happened-
when. For a history of the Ebola virus and outbreaks, see Georgina Casey, Ebola—The Facts, KAI 
TIAKI NURSING NEW ZEALAND, Dec. 2014 –Jan. 2015, at 20, 20–21.  
2.  Cases of Ebola Diagnosed in the United States, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/united-states-imported-case.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2015). Before Duncan, there were patients who contracted Ebola and were flown to the 
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hemorrhagic fever3 with a high mortality rate, particularly in Third World 
countries.4 While West Africa struggled to control the quickly rising death toll 
caused by the virus,5 fears in America6 mounted when two nurses who cared for 
Duncan7 and aid workers returning from Africa were diagnosed with Ebola.8 
In reaction to the Ebola cases, states began to devise quarantine measures. 
Quarantine9 refers to separation of individuals who have been exposed to an 
infection, but who are not sick, from those who have not been exposed.10 
Quarantine, by definition, focuses on persons showing no symptoms of 
infection.11 Isolation, on the other hand, involves separating infected persons 
from the noninfected population.12 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo 
announced plans to implement a mandatory twenty-one-day quarantine on all 
persons arriving in the United States who had contact with anyone infected with 
Ebola.13 The twenty-one-day quarantine period related to Ebola’s incubation 
period of two to twenty-one days.14 Florida,15 New Jersey, and Illinois followed 
 
United States to receive treatment. See Sydney Lupkin, Ebola in America: Timeline of the Deadly 
Virus, ABC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/ebola-america-
timeline/story?id=26159719.  
3.  See Ebola, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ebola/ 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
4.  The CDC reports that “[t]he 2014 Ebola epidemic is the largest in history, affecting multiple 
countries in West Africa.” 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). As 
of October 7, 2015, there were 28,465 total cases (suspected, probable, and confirmed) of Ebola, 
resulting in 11,312 deaths. Id.  
5.  See Lupkin, supra note 2.  
6.  Media Matters released a report tracking the number of Ebola-related stories, finding that 
“CNN ran 146 stories on Ebola the week of October 14, when panic was peaking.” Jonathan Cohn, 
Why Public Silence Greets Government Success, AM. PROSPECT (May 8, 2015), 
http://prospect.org/article/why-public-silence-greets-government-success.  
7.  See JAMES JAY CARAFANO, CHARLOTTE FLORANCE & DANIEL J. KANIEWSKI, HERITAGE 
FOUND., THE EBOLA OUTBREAK OF 2013–2014: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. ACTIONS 4 (2015), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/SR166.pdf (“Duncan’s entrance into the United States 
and the infection of two of his nurses galvanized public fears of Ebola.”). 
8.  See Lupkin, supra note 2.  
9.  For a history of quarantine, see Mark A. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and Ethical 
Considerations for Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 227, 229–34 (2015) [hereinafter 
Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola].  
10.  Quarantine and Isolation, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).  
11.  See id. 
12.  Id.  
13.  Bruzek, supra note 1.  
14.  Thomas W. Geisbert & Peter B. Jahrling, Towards a Vaccine Against Ebola Virus, 2 
EXPERT REV. VACCINES 777, 777 (2003).  
About 95 per cent of cases fall within this incubation period but 98 per cent of cases fall 
with[in] an incubation period of one to 42 days, hence the World Health Organisation’s 
requirement of 42 days Ebola-free to declare an outbreak contained. Mean incubation times 
in the west Africa outbreak appear to be nine to 11 days. 
Casey, supra note 1, at 23 (footnote omitted).  
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suit.16 Louisiana banned attendance to the annual American Society of Tropical 
Medicine and Hygiene meeting for all researchers who visited West Africa 
within a three-week span from the meeting,17 threatening a twenty-one-day 
mandatory hotel room quarantine for any noncomplying attendees.18 In total, 
twenty-one states imposed mandatory quarantines.19 
The CDC20 formulated guidelines for monitoring symptoms21 and 
controlling movement based on the level of risk posed by persons exposed to 
Ebola.22 These guidelines were less stringent than state guidelines and did not 
recommend mandatory quarantine for noncontagious, asymptomatic 
individuals.23 The controversy surrounding mandatory Ebola quarantines lies in 
the fact that asymptomatic persons are not contagious24 because Ebola is not 
airborne but is contracted through contact with bodily fluids,25 infected animals, 
 
15.  Matt Flegenheimer, Michael D. Shear & Michael Barbaro, Under Pressure, Cuomo Says 
Ebola Quarantines Can Be Spent at Home, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/nyregion/ebola-quarantine.html?_r=0. 
16.  Bruzek, supra note 1. Connecticut also joined those states and imposed a quarantine on 
travelers returning from West Africa. Evan Lips, Yale Grad Student Says Ebola Quarantine Driven by 
Politics, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:59 PM), http://www.nhregister.com/general-
news/20141028/yale-grad-student-says-ebola-quarantine-driven-by-politics.  
17.  Bruzek, supra note 1. Ironically, this meeting would have been relevant for infectious 
disease researchers. The New York Times reports, 
Dr. Alan J. Magill, the president of the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 
said the move by Louisiana to block doctors who had treated Ebola patients from its 
conference this weekend would harm crucial sessions where scientists, doctors and 
administrators who had been in the region were going to teach others. 
Jess Bidgood & Kate Zernike, From Governors, a Mix of Hard-Line Acts and Conciliation over Ebola, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/us/kaci-hickox-nurse-under-ebola-
quarantine-takes-bike-ride-defying-maine-officials.html?_r=0.  
18.  Bruzek, supra note 1.  
19.  Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola, supra note 9, at 255.  
20.  The CDC’s responsibilities include the prevention of “international and interstate spread of 
diseases.” Mark A. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2015, 
at 5, 5 [hereinafter Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law]. It operates twenty quarantine stations 
and assists states with “technical assistance, research, guidance, laboratory services, data collection, 
and other support.” Id.  
21.  Ebola symptoms can initially include “high fever, chills, malaise[,] and myalgia,” but 
“prostration, anorexia, vomiting, nausea, abdominal pain, diarrhea, shortness of breath, sore throat, 
edema, confusion[,] and coma” can later develop. Geisbert & Jahrling, supra note 14, at 777.  
22.  Factsheet on Updated CDC Guidance: Monitoring Symptoms and Controlling Movement to 
Stop the Spread of Ebola, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/monitoring-symptoms-controlling-movement.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 
2015); see also Betsy McKay, Collen McCain Nelson & Stephanie Armour, CDC Rejects Mandatory 
Ebola Quarantines, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-ebola-
quarantine-guidelines-released-by-cdc-1414443143.  
23.  McKay et al., supra note 22.  
24.  Memorandum from the Majority Staff, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to the Subcomm. 
on Oversight and Investigations (Oct. 14, 2014), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20141016/ 
102718/HHRG-113-IF02-20141016-SD002.pdf.  
25.  Professor Mark Rothstein explains that the risk of infection does not result merely from 
contact with any bodily fluid, but  
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or contaminated objects.26 
The federal authority to impose quarantines is specified in 42 U.S.C. § 264, 
the section of the Public Health Service Act that governs quarantines and 
communicable diseases.27 The Act gives 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread 
of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United 
States and within the United States and its territories/possessions. . . . 
Under its delegated authority, CDC, through the Division of Global 
Migration and Quarantine, is empowered to detain, medically examine, 
or conditionally release persons suspected of carrying a communicable 
disease.28 
President Ronald Regan, by Executive Order 12,452, added Ebola and 
other hemorrhagic fevers to the list of diseases over which federal quarantine 
could be imposed.29 The CDC rarely uses its quarantine powers but instead 
defers to state and local health authorities.30 The interplay between the 
Commerce Clause’s grant of federal authority to regulate foreign and interstate 
commerce31 and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of police powers to the 
states32 has resulted in placing the control of diseases within state borders with 
state and local governments, and the control of disease abroad and among the 
 
[i]n fact, contact must be with the highly infectious bodily fluid (i.e., vomit, diarrhea, or 
blood) of a seriously ill patient. . . . [T]here is no evidence of anyone becoming infected with 
Ebola in this epidemic without direct contact with the bodily fluid of an individual whose 
condition has progressed at least to the gastrointestinal phase of the illness. This phase 
occurs between three and ten days after the onset of symptoms. 
Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola, supra note 9, at 259.  
26. Transmission, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ 
ebola/transmission/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2015); Radio Interview by KOGO News Radio with 
Kristi Koenig, Professor of Emergency Med., U.C. Irvine Sch. of Med. (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.kogo.com/onair/afternoon-news-55377/kristi-koenig-on-ebola-12920492/. 
27.  42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).  
28.  Questions and Answers on Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/sars/quarantine/qa-isolation.html (last visited Nov. 1, 
2015).  
29.  Exec. Order No. 12,452, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,927 (Dec. 22, 1983). 
30.  Questions and Answers on Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, supra note 28 
(“In general, HHS defers to state and local health authorities in the primary use of their separate 
quarantine powers. Based on long experience and collaborative working relationships with our state 
and local partners, CDC anticipates that the need to use this federal authority to actually quarantine a 
person will occur only in rare situations, such as in events at ports of entry or other time-sensitive 
settings.”).  
31.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).  
32.  U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also 
Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 867 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Police power is unquestionably an area of 
traditional state control.”).  
   
6 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
states with the federal government.33 
Following Governor Cuomo’s announcement, the White House conceded 
that it had “limit[ed] . . . power” to enforce the CDC guidelines against the 
states,34 and tension with the White House ensued as presidential aids sought to 
persuade states to reconsider their mandatory bans.35 Governor Chris Christie 
later modified New Jersey’s mandatory quarantine requirement to allow Kaci 
Hickox, a nurse who had contact with Ebola-infected persons through her 
voluntary aid work in Africa,36 to spend the remainder of the quarantine period 
in her home.37 Contrary to numerous news media reports,38 Governor Christie 
denied insinuations that his actions were the result of pressure from the White 
House.39 
These events bring to the forefront an important question: Who should 
regulate quarantines? Further, what if Governor Christie had not relented? 
Recent scholarship on Ebola has focused on the civil rights of those affected by 
quarantine,40 particularly liberty and due process interests, all of which are 
important inquiries. But the issue of proper allocation of power between the 
states and the federal government to regulate Ebola quarantine has received 
little attention. 
This Article explores whether federal standards could preempt state Ebola 
regulations. There are political concerns that the federal government might 
consider in deciding whether it wants federal law to preempt state law.41 This 
Article does not suggest that such political constraints should be disregarded or 
that preemption can be achieved easily, but rather, the purpose of the Article is 
to provide legal arguments for preemption, if the federal government chooses to 
 
33.  James J. Misrahi, Joseph A. Foster, Frederic E. Shaw & Martin S. Cetron, HHS/CDC Legal 
Response to SARS Outbreak, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 353, 353 (2004). 
34.  McKay et al., supra note 22. Ironically, the media reported that Governor Cuomo “cast 
decisions on screening procedures as ‘a federal issue.’” Flegenheimer et al., supra note 15.  
35.  Flegenheimer et al., supra note 15.  
36.  See Rosa Prince, U.S. Nurse Who Threatened to Sue over Ebola Quarantine to Be Freed, 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 27, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ebola/ 
11190337/US-nurse-who-threatened-to-sue-over-Ebola-quarantine-to-be-freed.html. 
37.  Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, State Quarantine Powers Under the Constitution: 
Fear in the Age of Ebola, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/state-
quarantine-powers-under-the-constitution-fear-in-an-age-of-ebola. Kaci Hickox spent the first three 
days of her quarantine “in a tent on hospital grounds.” Id.  
38.  E.g., Prince, supra note 36 (reporting that “amid suggestions that the White House also 
opposed the quarantining of health workers who did not have symptoms, for fear it would put others 
off volunteering, Mr[.] Christie changed tack”).  
39.  Flegenheimer et al., supra note 15.  
40.  For an excellent discussion of the liberty interest and ethical concerns raised by Ebola 
quarantine, see Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola, supra note 9.  
41.  Preemption is also applicable to local government regulations. See, e.g., Wis. Pub. 
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613 (1991) (deciding whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act preempted a town’s regulation of pesticide use). The term “state law” is used 
throughout this Article to encompass the constitutions, regulations, rules, and ordinances of states, 
municipalities, etc.  
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pursue that strategy. Additionally, a discussion of what quarantine measures are 
appropriate and how they can be implemented is beyond the scope of this 
Article. This Article does not presuppose that implementation of quarantines is 
efficacious or advisable42 but aims to resolve the legal quandary over Ebola 
quarantines—how may the federal government regulate Ebola within state 
borders? While this Article focuses on Ebola quarantine regulations, the thrust 
of it is also applicable to state quarantine regulations over other illnesses, such as 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)43 and the like. 
This Article begins, in Section I, by briefly connecting the relationship 
among federalism, preemption, and supremacy to quarantine regulations. 
Section I also defines the types of preemption: express, obstacle, impossibility, 
and field preemption. Preemption allows federal law to trump state laws in a 
number of ways. A state law can conflict with federal law by making it 
impossible to meet both federal and state laws, which is known as impossibility 
preemption, or by impeding a federal objective, which is known as obstacle 
preemption. When this occurs, conflict preemption allows the federal law to 
override state law. A state law can also be displaced when it intrudes into a field 
exclusively reserved for the federal government or where there is a dominant 
federal interest. In these circumstances, field preemption also ousts state law. 
As discussed in Sections II and III respectively, the states’ two strongest 
arguments against federal displacement rest on their traditional police powers, 
particularly in the areas of health and safety, and the anti-preemption clause in 
the Federal Public Health Service Act.44 Although the Federal Act contains an 
anti-preemption clause that declines to preempt state law, the Supreme Court 
has previously allowed federal law to preempt other types of state law even in 
the face of anti-preemption clauses.45 
It is uncontested that quarantine laws fall within state police powers to 
 
42.  Public health experts, such as Donna Barbisch, Kristi L. Koenig, and Fuh-Yuan Shih, have 
noted that quarantines are difficult to implement and enforce. They have observed,  
While backed by legal authority, the public and even the health care worker community’s 
understanding of the term is murky at best and scientific evidence to support the use of 
quarantine is frequently lacking. The multiple interpretations and references to quarantine, 
the inconsistent application of public health quarantine laws across jurisdictional boundaries, 
and reports of ineffectiveness, are further complicated by associated infringement of civil 
liberties and human rights abuses. 
Donna Barbisch, Kristi L. Koenig & Fuh-Yuan Shih, Is There a Case for Quarantine? Perspectives 
from SARS to Ebola, DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS, Mar. 2015, at 1, 1. For a 
public response to mandatory quarantines, see Robert J. Blendon, Catherine M. DesRoches, Martin S. 
Cetron, John M. Benson, Theodore Meinhardt & William Pollard, Attitudes Toward the Use of 
Quarantine in a Public Health Emergency in Four Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar. 2006, at W15, 
W16 (surveying residents of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States on their concerns 
regarding compulsory quarantine).  
43.  In 2003, President George W. Bush signed an executive order that allowed quarantining 
persons with SARS and other contagious diseases, but not the flu. Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.cdc.gov/sars/quarantine/exec-2004-04-03.html.  
44.  42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (2012).  
45.  See infra Part III.A for a discussion of anti-preemption clauses.  
   
8 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
regulate health, safety, and welfare.46 The Court generally operates with a 
presumption against preemption when federal law touches on traditional state 
powers.47 However, even in traditional areas of state power, the Court has found 
preemption of state laws. Thus, neither the presumption against preemption, 
invoked when the federal law implicates state police powers, nor the anti-
preemption clause would necessarily safeguard state Ebola quarantine 
regulations from preemption. 
This Article argues, in Sections IV and V respectively, that state Ebola 
quarantine regulations can be preempted under obstacle preemption and field 
preemption doctrines. Obstacle preemption allows for the overriding of state 
laws when they impede a federal objective.48 The federal government could 
employ obstacle preemption to argue that state Ebola quarantine laws impede 
the federal government’s desire for uniform approaches to Ebola, national 
security via domestic efforts to contain Ebola, and federal commitment to 
combat Ebola abroad.49 State quarantine regulations frustrate federal efforts to 
contain Ebola in West Africa because they decrease the amount of healthcare 
workers available by discouraging volunteers and making travel impossible while 
under quarantine. Consequently, the inability to contain Ebola in West Africa 
threatens national security. 
Field preemption is concerned with state laws that intrude on an area of 
exclusive federal domain and can invalidate state law if states regulate in an area 
where there is a pervasive federal scheme or a dominant federal interest.50 At 
least one species of field preemption is applicable to preempt state Ebola 
regulations. Although it is unlikely that the Federal Public Health Service Act 
has sufficient breadth to support field preemption based on a pervasive federal 
scheme, state Ebola regulations could be preempted because of a dominant 
federal purpose. The dominant federal purposes are national security and 
control over foreign affairs, which would be affected by the spread of Ebola in 
the United States and abroad. Relatedly, the President’s independent foreign 
affairs power could also support preempting state Ebola quarantine laws. Thus, 
 
46.  See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 
387 (1902) (“That from an early day the power of the States to enact and enforce quarantine laws for 
the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants has been recognized by Congress, is 
beyond question.”). 
47.  See infra Section II.  
48.  See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the different types of preemption.  
49.  Of course, the viability of these arguments depends on whether there is sufficient leadership 
from the Executive for a court to discern the federal objective. Public health experts have noted the 
failure of the CDC and the President to provide clear guidance regarding Ebola. At first, the CDC did 
not recommend quarantining persons who had contact with patients before the patients became 
infectious. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola, supra note 9, at 256. Later, the CDC revised its policy to 
recommend all health workers who traveled to West Africa—even those who were asymptomatic—to 
undergo “direct active monitoring.” Id. at 257. Professor Rothstein observes, “The CDC’s revision of 
its guidance, however, by following more aggressive state policies, may have increased doubts about 
the adequacy of CDC’s initial recommendations, thereby seeming to confirm the wisdom of the 
expanded quarantine measures imposed by some state governments.” Id. at 260–61.  
50.  See infra Part I.C for a discussion of field and obstacle preemption.  
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federal preemption of state Ebola quarantine laws would protect the United 
States as well as countries abroad. 
I. FRAMING THE QUARANTINE ISSUE 
A. The Intersection of Federalism, Supremacy, and Preemption 
“Today’s legal debates about federalism, as it applies to issues of health and 
safety . . . are often debates about statutory preemption.”51 Federalism involves 
determining the proper allocation of power between the federal and state 
governments52 and encompasses the recognition that “both the National and 
State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to 
respect.”53 Federalism includes the balance of Congress’s exercise of its powers, 
as granted in Article I of the Constitution, with the reservation of power to the 
states, as articulated in the Tenth Amendment.54 
At times, maintaining that balance necessitates the utilization of 
preemption, one mechanism of distributing power between the federal and state 
governments.55 Preemption commands that state law yield in the face of 
conflicting federal law56 and owes its origins to the Supremacy Clause,57 the 
source of congressional power to preempt58 state law.59 Preemption functions by 
 
51.  Robert R. M. Verchick & Nina A. Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism 1 
(Univ. of Michigan Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 98, 
2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030597.  
52.  Id. at 2.  
53.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).  
54.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”).  
55.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 405 (4th ed. 
2011) (“Ultimately, preemption doctrines are about allocating governing authority between the 
federal and state governments.”).  
56.  The Court has used the terms “conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; 
difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference” to describe some 
of its considerations in determining the validity of state laws in light of federal law. Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
57.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding”).  
58.  Scholars use different terminology to describe overruling existing state law. Professor 
Stephen Gardbaum uses “preemption” while Professor Thomas Merrill uses “displacement”; this 
Article uses the terms interchangeably. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 727, 730–31 (2008).  
59.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500. The Court itself has recognized that preemption derives from 
the Supremacy Clause. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (“[U]nder the 
Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly 
within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’” 
(quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988))); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 
458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (“The pre-emption doctrine . . . has its roots in the Supremacy Clause . . . .”).  
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overriding existing valid state law. As will be discussed later in greater detail, 
some instances of preemption void the particular state law at issue, leaving other 
nonconflicting state law in tact; in other instances, preemption results in banning 
states from regulating in an entire area of law.  
B. Values of Federalism 
Whether preemption should be applied rests on a value judgment about the 
benefits of federalism: (1) protection against federal tyranny, (2) states’ ability to 
tailor policies reflecting local concerns, and (3) states as laboratories.60 The 
following provides a brief discussion of these benefits, but an exhaustive 
exploration is beyond the scope of this Article. 
The first justification for protecting state sovereignty is that it is a bulwark 
against federal tyranny. This justification depends on the vertical separation of 
powers between the levels of government as a means to “avoid the undue 
concentration of power in the federal government and preserve essential 
individual liberties.”61 But “there has been a major shift over time as to how 
abusive government is best controlled. . . . Judicial review is seen as an important 
check against tyrannical government actions.”62  
Yet, some scholars observe that the Court’s recent use of preemption has 
hampered civil rights and protection of individuals.63 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky 
criticizes the Court’s preemption jurisprudence as “wrong in invalidating 
desirable state and local laws creating liability for injured consumers, protecting 
 
Some scholars, however, argue that the Supremacy Clause is not the proper source of authority to 
support preemption doctrines. Professor Gardbaum theorizes that preemption should be grounded in 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 782. He points out that there are 
distinctions between preemption and supremacy, and that “[s]upremacy does not presuppose 
preemption.” Id. at 769. Supremacy and preemption involve circumstances when state and federal 
governments share concurrent power. Id. at 770. Professor Gardbaum delineates the different roles of 
supremacy and preemption: supremacy regulates concurrency by allowing for state and federal laws to 
coexist and elevating federal law when a conflict occurs, while preemption ends state powers 
completely. Id. at 771. As he posits, supremacy arises when valid federal law overrides conflicting valid 
state laws, but because states have power to legislate in the area, they may amend their laws to avoid 
the conflict. Id. at 770–71. On the other hand, preemption removes a state’s power to legislate in the 
area, which in effect obviates the need to resolve the conflict between valid state and federal law. Id. at 
771. Thus, according to Professor Gardbaum, supremacy involves a case-by-case analysis and cannot 
eliminate state legislative powers over an entire field. Id. at 772–73. Consequently, Professor 
Gardbaum argues that preemption is a greater power, not derived from supremacy—a lesser power. 
Id. at 774.  
        Other scholars argue that the Supremacy Clause is the source of authority for some types of 
preemption. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of 
the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829 (1992).  
60.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 320–22; Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, 
Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY 
OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 13, 16–17 (William L. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
61.  Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 60, at 16.  
62.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 321.  
63.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to 
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315–16 (2004).  
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children from tobacco advertisements, and requiring insurance companies to 
disclose their Holocaust-era policies.”64 
On the other hand, some scholars find that preemption can lead to 
beneficial results for the people.65 Professor Hiroshi Motomura shows the value 
of preemption as an alternative method of vindicating individual rights, 
particularly in discrimination cases, when the pursuit of other principles like 
equal protection have not been fruitful.66 He observes, “Given the obstacles to 
equal protection claims by unauthorized migrants, preemption has become the 
challenge of choice, and thus the focus of judicial opinions.”67 The value of 
preemption, as Professor Motomura points out, is that it “avoids serious 
constitutional questions about the efficacy of arguments based on an individual 
right like equal protection by enabling an institutional competence argument, 
which in turn forces government decisionmaking into a federal forum that makes 
a constitutionally doubtful statute less likely.”68 Granted, a victory founded on a 
preemption argument may sidestep pronouncing a moral judgment,69 thereby 
failing to vindicate a litigant’s moral sensibilities, but such preemption victories 
establish boundaries that states must respect. 
The second argument in favor of preserving state authority to regulate is 
that states are closer to the people and can better devise policies that address 
local concerns.70 “[O]ne of the stronger arguments for a decentralized political 
structure is that, to the extent the electorate is small, and elected representatives 
are thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns, 
government is brought closer to the people, and democratic ideals are more fully 
realized.”71 But, of course, empowering government can lead to “pernicious 
objectives.”72 
A third benefit of federalism is that states may function as laboratories to 
“try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”73 But “[t]he key question is when is it worth experimenting, and when 
is experimentation to be rejected because of a need to impose a national 
 
64.  Id.  
65.  See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside 
the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1736 (2010) (suggesting that many challengers of immigration laws now 
use preemption arguments as an alternative to equal protection claims).  
66.  Id.  
67.  Id.  
68.  Id. at 1745.  
69.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal 
Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 99 (1985) (“prefer[ring] an equal protection approach . . . 
because it answers, in a way that preemption reasoning does not, the moral and philosophical claims 
that resident aliens make against their state governments”).  
70.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 321; Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 60, at 16–17.  
71.  Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at 1324 (alteration in original) (quoting DAVID SHAPIRO, 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–92 (1995)).  
72.  Id. at 1333.  
73.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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mandate?”74 Relatedly, state-centered approaches might lead to negative 
externalities that harm people out of state.75 
Ultimately, federalism should be justified on the basis of the people. 
“States’ rights are not an end in themselves. They are a means to the crucial 
objectives of advancing freedom and enriching the lives of those in the United 
States.”76 Thus, it should not be presumed that state sovereignty best effectuates 
the values underlying federalism. Preemption might be the more effective 
vehicle in the case of Ebola. Generally, those who support state sovereignty and 
individual rights would argue against preempting state law. In the case of Ebola, 
however, preempting state quarantine laws would advance individual rights, such 
as those of Kaci Hickox and others subjected to mandatory quarantine. 
C. Types of Preemption 
In addition to consideration of the value of federalism, the other 
consideration in applying preemption77 rests on a determination of congressional 
intent to exclude state regulation, for, as the Court has stated, congressional 
intent is the “ultimate touchstone.”78 The most explicit manifestation of 
congressional intent is express preemption, by which Congress, through the text 
of legislation, withdraws specified powers from the states.79 When a statute lacks 
an express preemption clause, congressional intent to prohibit state intrusion can 
also be inferred through two forms of implied preemption: field or conflict 
preemption.80 
Field preemption results when states legislate in a field over which Congress 
has exclusive governance.81 Field preemption exists when federal legislation in a 
particular area is so extensive and “pervasive” as to signal the federal 
government’s implied intent to occupy the field and exclude states from 
legislating in that field.82 The Court has described field preemption as involving 
 
74.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 322.  
75.  Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 60, at 18.  
76.  Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at 1316.  
77.  For a history of the development of preemption doctrines, see Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the 
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 972–1005 (2002); Patricia L. Donze, 
Legislating Comity: Can Congress Enforce Federalism Constraints Through Restrictions on Preemption 
Doctrine?, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 246–49 (2000–2001); Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 
785–807.  
78.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2531 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
79.  Id. at 2500–01 (majority opinion); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 
88, 98 (1992) (describing the types of preemption).  
80.  See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. Professor Gardbaum argues that the term “conflict 
preemption” is contradictory because when a valid state law yields to federal law, it is not due to 
preemption but to supremacy. Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 809.  
81.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501.  
82.  Id. (“The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of 
regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there 
is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement 
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federal legislation that is intended to be a “single integrated and all-embracing 
system,”83 “complete scheme,”84 “harmonious whole,”85 or “comprehensive and 
unified system.”86 A dominant federal interest in a field might also lead to an 
assumption that Congress intended to exclude state legislation in the area.87 
Conflict preemption occurs when the laws are mutually exclusive, in other 
words, when it is “physical[ly] impossib[le]” to comply with federal and state 
law.88 Another form of conflict preemption is obstacle preemption, which 
overrides a state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”89 The Court has, in 
some instances, treated obstacle preemption as a subset of conflict preemption,90 
 
of state laws on the same subject.’” (omissions in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). 
83.  Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941)). 
84.  Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67). 
85.  Id. at 2502 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 72).  
86.  Id. 
87.  See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Hines, 312 U.S. at 70.  
88.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 
U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).  
89.  Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. Obstacle preemption is 
controversial. First, the problem in attacking a state law under obstacle preemption lies in the 
difficulty of ascertaining the “full purposes and objectives” of federal law. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 
86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000). Because each member of Congress has her own reason(s) for passing 
legislation and the process of lawmaking entails compromises, it is difficult to attribute a collective 
purpose to a federal statute. Id. at 280. 
Second, scholars have argued that obstacle preemption conflicts with a textual approach. Justice 
Thomas criticizes the Court’s use of obstacle preemption for straying from the federal statute’s text. 
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Note, 
Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1058 (2013) (arguing that implied 
preemption conflicts with a textualist approach). Consistent with a textual approach, Professor S. 
Candice Hoke recommends that preemption be circumscribed to include only situations of conflict 
between state and federal actions. Hoke, supra note 59, at 886. Professor John Ohlendorf, however, 
questions the assumption that obstacle preemption and textualism are irreconcilable. John David 
Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 373 (2013). Professor Daniel 
Meltzer offers another defense of obstacle preemption, arguing that it is too “difficult[] and 
burden[some]” for Congress to write laws directly addressing preemption issues, as Congress would 
need to be familiar with the endless number of state and local laws and foresee how federal legislation 
would impact them. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 
377.  
Finally, Professor Caleb Nelson points out that obstacle preemption can result in unnecessary 
invalidation of state laws: “The mere fact that Congress enacts a statute to serve certain purposes, 
then, does not automatically imply that Congress wants to displace all state law that gets in the way of 
those purposes.” Nelson, supra, at 281. Professor Susan Raeker-Jordan also contends that obstacle 
preemption undercuts the presumption against preemption because a frustration of federal objectives 
can be easily found. Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-emption 
Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1385 (1998). Similarly, describing the Court’s 
general preemption practice as overzealous, Professor Patricia Donze fears the Court’s use of 
preemption when Congress truly did not intend to displace state law. Donze, supra note 77, at 255.  
90.  See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (referring to conflict preemption as including “cases 
‘where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,’ and . . . instances 
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but state laws that impede a federal objective can be preempted even if state and 
federal laws are not mutually exclusive.91 
The categories at times overlap,92 and their application has not always been 
clear.93 The confusion is worsened by the Justices’ disagreement as to what type 
of preemption arises in a given situation. For example, Justice Blackmun 
suggested that “field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-
emption,” explaining that a state’s legislation in a particular field can conflict 
with congressional intent to preclude state legislation.94 Justice O’Connor later 
subscribed to the same view in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 
a case that engendered a different debate about the distinctions between express 
and implied preemption.95 In Gade, however, Justice Kennedy contended that 
the case raised an express preemption issue, rather than implied preemption.96 
Additionally, in another case, Justice Souter acknowledged an unsettled question 
as to whether field or conflict preemption should be applied to the executive 
 
where the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress” (quoting Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 143; then quoting Hines, 312 
U.S. at 67))).  
91.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 404.  
92.  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992) (noting that 
preemption categories are not “rigidly distinct” (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 
(1990))).  
The boundaries between the types of preemption may become blurrier as Congress begins to 
meld implied preemption with express preemption provisions. In one particular statute, Congress has 
written obstacle preemption into its legislation: “[A] requirement of a State, political subdivision of a 
State, or Indian tribe is preempted if . . . the requirement of the State, political subdivision, or tribe, as 
applied or enforced, is an obstacle to accomplishing and carrying out this chapter, a regulation 
prescribed under this chapter . . . .” 49 U.S.C. § 5125(a)(2) (2012); see also Nelson, supra note 89, at 
279 (quoting legislation); Note, supra note 89, at 1076 (referring to statute).  
93.  Scholars alike have described the Court’s preemption jurisprudence as a “muddle,” “chaos,” 
an “awful mess,” and “wildly confused.” Nelson, supra note 89, at 232–33 (collecting scholarly 
criticisms of the Court’s treatment of the preemption doctrines); see Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign 
Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 178 (“The Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence is 
famous for its incoherence.”). Professor Hoke has remarked,  
One searches the Court’s preemption cases in vain to uncover a unitary structure for 
preemption analysis; indeed, inconsistency persists even among the opinions authored by 
any single Justice. Scholars and commentators on various preemption issues also vary their 
inventory of preemption types or categories and fail to agree on their interrelation. 
S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 733 
(1991) (footnotes omitted). Professor Ernest Young explains that the Court’s diverging approaches 
result from “the fact that any overarching framework of preemption principles must be applied to 
interpret a range of quite diverse statutory regimes, including many in which courts must share 
interpretive duties with federal agencies.” Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The 
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 255 [hereinafter 
Young, The Ordinary Diet of the Law].  
94.  Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. at 79 n.5 (1990). Professor Nelson suggests that field and conflict 
preemption should not be confined to the subset of implied preemption, but that both types of 
preemption may arise in the context of an express statement or by implication. Nelson, supra note 89, 
at 263. 
95.  505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992).  
96.  Gade, 505 U.S. at 109 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
   
2015] UNDER CONTAINMENT 15 
 
foreign relations power.97 Ultimately, the Court has noted the lack of “an 
infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick” and 
resolved that “[i]n the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly 
marked formula.”98 
This Article seeks to apply these preemption doctrines to state quarantine 
regulations, but as a result of the preemption categories’ fluidity, the analysis 
discussed in one section of this Article may also be applicable to other sections. 
II. PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION 
One shield that states could deploy to protect their quarantine regulations is 
the presumption against preemption. The Court has devised a presumption 
against preemption,99 based on the fact that 
because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, 
we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt 
state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in 
those in which Congress has “legislated . . . in a field which the States 
have traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”100 
The presumption against preemption has been applied in a number of 
contexts: (1) as only a mere “assumption that Congress did not intend to displace 
state law,”101 (2) when federal acts touch only “historic police powers of the 
State[],”102 or (3) when accompanied with a requirement of a statement 
indicating Congress’s clear and manifest purpose.103 
 
97.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 398 (2003) (discussing the appropriate label for 
the type of preemption in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)).  
98.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
99.  Some scholars question the presumption against preemption. Professor Nelson, for example, 
offers a theory that the Supremacy Clause is a non obstante provision, and as such, it undermines the 
presumption against preemption. Nelson, supra note 89, at 232. He explains that non obstante clauses 
have been used to obviate the need to harmonize a new law with prior ones by allowing the new law to 
displace any prior contradictory law. Id. Thus, the natural operation of the Supremacy Clause’s non 
obstante provision rebuts the need for a residual presumption against the invalidation of state laws. Id. 
at 293. For different reasons, Professor Jack Goldsmith advocates for abandoning the presumption 
against preemption, as well as the presumption in favor of foreign affairs. Goldsmith, supra note 93, at 
177. Professor Viet D. Dinh argues that when Congress legislates within its enumerated power, no 
presumption for or against preemption should be applied. Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of 
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2092 (2000).  
100.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); then quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1985)).  
101.  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).  
102.  Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.  
103.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991). For an explanation about the differences 
between the presumption against preemption and the clear statement rule, see Young, The Ordinary 
Diet of the Law, supra note 93, at 271–72.  
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States could argue that Ebola quarantine regulations are strictly within their 
purview because health and safety are established areas of traditional state 
power,104 and consequently, the presumption against preemption should apply. 
Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health is one of the earliest 
Supreme Court cases to review quarantine regulations.105 The case’s central 
issue involved the constitutionality of the fee New Orleans imposed for each 
vessel passing a quarantine station.106 The Court upheld the fee against 
allegations that the fee was in fact a tonnage tax, a tax prohibited by the 
Constitution.107 In so doing, it recognized quarantine as a police power.108 In 
another case, Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board 
of Health, the Court upheld, on the basis of state police powers, a quarantine 
resolution that prohibited vessels from landing in parishes under quarantine.109 
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, by upholding state compulsory smallpox 
vaccination laws, the Court also affirmed state police powers to regulate health 
and safety: “According to settled principles the police power of a State must be 
held to embrace, at least such reasonable regulations established directly by 
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”110 
Thus, that quarantine regulation falls within state police powers is not 
controversial. 
All these cases, however, acknowledged the ability of the federal 
government to displace state quarantine laws. In the Morgan’s Louisiana case, 
the Court stated, 
[F]or while it may be a police power in the sense that all provisions for 
health, comfort, and security of the citizens are police regulations, and 
an exercise of the police power, even where such powers are so 
exercised as to come within the domain of federal authority as defined 
in the constitution, the latter must prevail.111 
In Compagnie Francaise, the Court recognized that “quarantine laws belong to 
that class of state legislation which . . . [is] valid until displaced . . . by 
Congress.”112 Similarly, the Jacobson Court conceded, “A local enactment or 
regulation, even if based on the acknowledged police powers of a State, must 
always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the General Government of 
any power it possesses under the Constitution, or with any right which that 
instrument gives or secures.”113 A state might argue that these statements merely 
 
104.  See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“According to settled principles the 
police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least such reasonable regulations established 
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”). 
105.  118 U.S. 455 (1886).  
106.  Morgan’s S.S., 118 U.S. at 455.  
107.  Id. at 461–63.  
108.  Id. at 464. 
109.  186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902).  
110.  197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).  
111.  Morgan’s S.S., 118 U.S. at 464.  
112.  Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 389.  
113.  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25.  
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reflect the principle embodied in the Supremacy Clause and that, without more, 
the states’ exercise of police powers to regulate Ebola quarantine should be 
presumed not preempted.  
But the presumption against preemption, as some scholars observe, has 
been whittled down, so much so as to transform the presumption into one in 
favor of preemption.114 Professor Susan Raeker-Jordan describes the courts’ 
approaches to preemption as “free-wheeling” and undermining the presumption 
against preemption by allowing “relatively easy” displacement of state law.115 
Similarly, Professor Mary Davis concludes the Supreme Court’s preemption 
jurisprudence has shown a trend away from preserving state authority to 
respecting federal authority and the need for uniformity.116 Additionally, some 
members of the Court have argued that a presumption against preemption is 
entirely unnecessary when the federal law at issue contains an express 
preemption clause.117 
The Court’s move in the direction of a presumption in favor of preemption 
is evident from its decisions in family law cases. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, in 
examining a Washington state statute where “designation of a spouse as the 
beneficiary of a nonprobate asset [wa]s revoked automatically upon divorce,”118 
the Court acknowledged that family and probate law are areas of traditional 
state powers.119 Notwithstanding that acknowledgement, the Court invalidated 
the law as preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA): “[W]e have not hesitated to find state family law pre-empted when it 
conflicts with ERISA or relates to ERISA plans.”120 Similarly, the long history 
of state community property laws did not shield state laws from obstacle 
preemption in Boggs v. Boggs.121 Likewise, that a state regulation concerned 
family law did not prevent its preemption in McCarty v. McCarty,122 Ridgway v. 
 
114.  For example, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argues that Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 
529 U.S. 861 (2000); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); and American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) 
indicate that the Supreme Court maintains a presumption in favor of preemption. Chemerinsky, supra 
note 63, at 1318–24.  
115.  Raeker-Jordan, supra note 89, at 1468.  
116.  Davis, supra note 77, at 1013.  
117.  In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, rejected the 
majority’s conclusion “that express pre-emption provisions must be construed narrowly, ‘in light of the 
presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations,’” and suggested that the Court 
apply ordinary rules of statutory construction to the express provision. 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito have also taken this view. Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the 
Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1266 (2010).  
118.  532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001).  
119.  Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151.  
120.  Id. at 151–52. 
121.  520 U.S. 833, 840–41 (1997).  
122.  453 U.S. 210 (1981) (preempting the state court’s division of military nondisability retired 
pay as community property in a divorce proceeding).  
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Ridgway,123 or Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo.124 
Property law is another traditional area of state power that is not immune to 
preemption. In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, property 
owners challenged the due-on-sale provision in a trust deed held by a federally 
chartered savings and loan association.125 The Court conceded that “real 
property law is a matter of special concern to the States,” but asserted that “[t]he 
relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a 
conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided 
that the federal law must prevail.”126 Accordingly, the Court found the state’s 
due-on-sale law preempted on the basis of obstacle preemption.127 
Even in the state’s traditional field of health and safety, the Court has found 
preemption, despite any presumption against preemption. In Gade, the Court 
recognized a state’s “compelling interest” to protect health and safety and to 
regulate licensing and professions.128 But it reiterated “any state law, however 
clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary 
to federal law, must yield [to federal law],” and invalidated the state’s regulation 
of the training, testing, and licensing of hazardous waste workers.129 
The Court has insisted on a showing of “clear and substantial” federal 
interests before preempting laws within traditional state powers, but the Court, 
“even in th[ose] area[s], has not hesitated to protect, under the Supremacy 
Clause, rights and expectancies established by federal law against the operation 
of state law, or to prevent the frustration and erosion of the congressional policy 
embodied in the federal rights.”130 Thus, to preserve their Ebola quarantine 
regulations, states should not rest solely on the presumption against preemption 
but must be prepared to defend against the various forms of preemption. 
III. EXPRESS PREEMPTION 
Usually, federal law containing preemption provisions can pose a serious 
threat to state laws because congressional intent to supersede state law is 
unambiguous. Because express preemption is obvious from its text, it obviates 
any controversy in determining whether preemption exists but shifts the focus to 
 
123.  454 U.S. 46 (1981) (holding that the Federal Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act 
precluded application of constructive trust against the insurance proceeds).  
124.  439 U.S. 572 (1979) (invalidating the state court’s division of community property and its 
award of the husband’s expected retirement benefits to his wife in a divorce proceeding, pursuant to 
the Federal Railroad Retirement Act).  
125.  458 U.S. 141, 148–49 (1982) (citing Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978)).  
126.  Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 
(1962)).  
127.  Id. at 156.  
128.  505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).  
129.  Gade, 505 U.S. at 108–09 (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).  
130.  Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981) (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 
572, 581 (1979)). 
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determining the scope of the preemption.131 
In the present situation, the relevant federal statute, the Public Health 
Service Act, does not contain an express preemption clause,132 and, therefore, 
states need not fear this form of preemption. Better yet, states could make use of 
the Public Health Service Act’s anti-preemption clause.133 Anti-preemption 
clauses are an express declination to override state law. Relatedly, saving 
clauses, provisions within a statute that contain express intent to leave some 
aspect of state law intact, function like anti-preemption clauses. Because the 
Court has sometimes used these terms interchangeably,134 both types of clauses 
will be analyzed. 
A. Anti-Preemption Clauses 
States might argue that the anti-preemption clause of the Federal Public 
Health Service Act affords them protection against preemption and ensures that 
states may regulate quarantines. Section 264 of the Public Health Service Act, 
regulating quarantine and communicable diseases, contains the following anti-
preemption clause: 
Nothing in this section or section 266 of this title, or the regulations 
promulgated under such sections, may be construed as superseding any 
provision under State law (including regulations and including 
provisions established by political subdivisions of States), except to the 
extent that such a provision conflicts with an exercise of Federal 
authority under this section or section 266 of this title.135 
California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co. is one example of an 
 
131.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (“In these cases, our task is to 
identify the domain expressly pre-empted . . . .”).  
For examples of instances in which the Supreme Court found express preemption of state laws, 
see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), in which the Court found state tort claims 
preempted through the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; 
Engine Manufacturers v. South Coast Air Quality Management, 541 U.S. 246 (2004), in which the Court 
concluded that the Federal Clean Air Act preempted state motor vehicle pollution standards; 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), in which the Court held that the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempted a state law regulating point-of-sale and 
outdoor advertising of cigarettes; Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000), in 
which the Court determined that the Federal Railroad Safety Act preempted a wrongful death claim 
alleging that a railroad failed to maintain adequate warning devices at its crossings; and Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987), in which the Court concluded that the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act preempted state law tort and contract claims for breach of contract, 
retaliatory discharge, and wrongful termination of disability benefits.  
For an example of a circumstance in which the Court upheld a state law against an express 
preemption challenge, see California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham 
Construction, Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997), in which the Court found that the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act did not preempt California’s wage law. 
132.  42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).  
133.  Id. § 264(e).  
134.  See infra note 141 for a discussion of the interchangeable use of the terms “anti-preemption 
clause” and “saving clause.” 
135.  42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (emphasis added).  
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effective congressional disclaimer against preempting state law.136 Granite Rock, 
a company that held unpatented mining claims on federally owned land in 
California, challenged California’s permit requirement for mining within the 
state.137 Granite Rock relied upon the following provision of the Federal Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA): 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed— 
(1) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction, responsibility, or 
rights in the field of planning, development, or control of water 
resources, submerged lands, or navigable waters; nor to displace, 
supersede, limit, or modify any interstate compact or the jurisdiction or 
responsibility of any legally established joint or common agency of two 
or more states or of two or more states and the Federal Government; 
nor to limit the authority of Congress to authorize and fund projects 
. . . .138 
The legislative history of the CZMA included the Senate report revealing 
the CZMA’s purpose: “There is no attempt to diminish state authority through 
federal preemption. The intent of this legislation [the CZMA] is to enhance state 
authority by encouraging and assisting the states to assume planning and 
regulatory powers over their coastal zones.”139 The Court concluded that the 
CZMA did not preempt state permit requirements because of the CZMA’s 
legislative history and language.140 
State Ebola regulations are still vulnerable because the Court has not 
hesitated to overrule state law, even in the face of an anti-preemption clause. For 
example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which regulates insurance, contains an 
express anti-preemption clause: “No Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such 
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .”141 
Whether a state law is preempted hinges on an important qualifier—“relates 
to”—in the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s anti-preemption clause142: “[A] federal 
statute will not pre-empt a state statute enacted ‘for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance’—unless the federal statute ‘specifically relates to the 
 
136.  480 U.S. 572, 592 (1987). Another example of a state’s successful assertion of an anti-
preemption provision can be found in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 
746 (1985).  
137.  Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 576–77.  
138.  16 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(1) (2012).  
139.  Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 592 (quoting S. REP. 92-753, at 1 (1972)).  
140.  Id. at 593.  
141.  15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). Courts have used the term “anti-preemption” clause 
interchangeably with the term “saving clause” to identify this provision of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act. See Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1996) (referring to the provision 
as an anti-preemption rule); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 746 (referring to the provision as a saving 
clause).  
142.  Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 38.  
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business of insurance.’”143 In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the 
issue arose out of the tension between a federal law authorizing national banks 
to sell insurance and a state law prohibiting such banks to sell insurance.144 The 
anti-preemption clause was not applied to protect state law in Barnett Bank 
because the federal authorization to sell insurance specifically related to the 
business of insurance.145 
As Barnett Bank and Granite Rock demonstrate, whether states would 
prevail in asserting the Public Health Service Act’s anti-preemption clause to 
prevent displacement of state quarantine laws depends on an examination of the 
Act’s language and legislative history. A search of section 264 of the Public 
Health Service Act’s legislative history yields no statement similar to that in 
Granite Rock that sheds light on the anti-preemption clause. Textually, the 
Public Health Service Act’s anti-preemption clause does not safeguard against 
all preemption; it allows for preemption if state legislation conflicts with the 
Federal Act. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether state quarantine 
regulations conflict with federal law. 
B. Saving Clauses 
If the provision in the Public Health Service Act is construed as a saving 
clause, it might still preserve state law.146 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick provides 
an example of an effective saving clause.147 In that case, the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act encompassed a saving clause, which provided that 
“[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this 
subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common 
law.”148 That saving clause protected state regulation from preemption because 
the Court found that states were free to regulate aspects of vehicle performance, 
such as stopping distances and vehicle stability that were not covered by federal 
regulation.149  
In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, however, a saving clause provided 
limited relief from preemption.150 In that case, Vermont regulated effluent 
discharges into Lake Champlain, which a paper company challenged as 
preempted by the Federal Clean Water Act.151 The Clean Water Act contained 
 
143.  Id. 27–28 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).  
144.  Id. at 28–29.  
145.  Id. at 38.  
146.  The Court has used the terms “savings clause” and “saving clause” to describe such 
provisions. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
plurality) (referring to a “saving clause”); Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987) 
(referring to a “savings clause”). For an additional discussion of saving(s) clauses, see Wyeth v. Levine, 
555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009).  
147.  514 U.S. 280, 284 (1995).  
148.  Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 284 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed 1994)).  
149.  Id. at 286.  
150.  479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987).  
151.  Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 484.  
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provisions that acted as a saving clause. The first provision provided that, 
“[e]xcept as expressly provided[,] . . . nothing in this chapter shall . . . be 
construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the 
States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.”152 
The second provision stated, “Nothing in this section shall restrict any right 
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common 
law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief . . . .”153 The Clean Water Act, notwithstanding the saving clause, 
overrode Vermont’s law because allowing states affected by discharge to 
regulate individually would impede federal objectives.154 Casting aside the saving 
clause, the Court stated, “[W]e do not believe Congress intended to undermine 
this carefully drawn statute through a general saving clause . . . .”155 
Similarly, a saving clause failed to prevent federal law from eclipsing state 
law in Gade.156 In Gade, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) 
contained two saving clauses. Section 4(b)(4) of the OSH Act provided the 
following: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any 
manner affect any workmen’s compensation law or to enlarge or 
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory 
rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law 
with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, 
or in the course of, employment.157 
Additionally, section 18(a) of the OSH Act provided that no “State agency or 
court [shall be prevented] from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any 
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect 
under section 655 of this title.”158 Despite the saving clause, the Court held that 
the OSH Act preempted state laws establishing training for hazardous waste 
workers. The Court explained, “Although this is a saving clause, not a pre-
emption clause, the natural implication of this provision is that state laws 
regulating the same issue as federal laws are not saved, even if they merely 
supplement the federal standard.”159 
Other examples of when the Court concluded that saving clauses were 
inadequate to salvage state law can be found in rulings discussing ERISA and 
the Death on the High Seas Act.160 In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the 
Court held that an employee’s common law breach of contract and tort suit 
 
152.  33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2012).  
153.  Id. § 1365(e).  
154.  Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 493–94. 
155.  Id. at 494.  
156.  505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992). 
157.  Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 4(b)(4), 84 Stat. 1590 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2012)). 
158.  29 U.S.C. § 667(a). 
159.  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992).  
160.  See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that a state suit alleging 
improper processing of claims for benefits was preempted by ERISA).  
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against the insurance company that issued his insurance policy161 was not 
covered within the saving clause and thus was preempted by ERISA.162 In 
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, the Court interpreted a saving clause 
narrowly as a jurisdictional saving clause, which did not preclude imposition of 
federal substantive law to preempt conflicting state wrongful death statutes.163 
State law may also be preempted if the Court narrowly construes a saving 
clause.164 For example, in United States v. Locke, the Court interpreted a saving 
clause in the Federal Oil Pollution Act to allow state regulation of “liability rules 
and financial requirements relating to oil spills,” but not of a vessel’s conduct.165 
The Court reasoned, “We decline to give broad effect to saving clauses where 
doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal 
law.”166 
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Court interpreted two 
provisions in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act: an express 
preemption clause and a saving clause.167 The preemption provision prohibited 
states from establishing “any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of 
performance of” motor vehicles “which is not identical to the Federal 
standard,”168 while the saving clause expressed that compliance with federal law 
“does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.”169 The 
Court declined to find that the saving clause immunized state tort claims beyond 
the express preemption provision—leaving those claims vulnerable to conflict 
preemption.170 
Therefore, regardless of whether the provision in the Public Health Service 
Act is construed as an anti-preemption or a saving clause, it might be inadequate 
to guard against nullification of state quarantine laws. Under either construction, 
the provision will be interpreted narrowly, making state legislation susceptible to 
field and conflict preemption. 
 
161.  Id. at 43.  
162.  Id. at 57.  
163.  477 U.S. 207, 227 (1986) (holding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the 
Death on the High Seas Act preempted a wrongful death suit over the deaths of offshore drilling 
platform workers killed in a helicopter crash off of Louisiana’s coast). 
164.  See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105–07 (2000).  
165.  Id. at 105.  
166.  Id. at 106.  
167.  529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).  
168.  Gier, 529 U.S. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994)).  
169.  Id. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed 1994)).  
170.  Id. at 874; see also Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 329 (2011) 
(explaining that the existence of a saving clause “makes clear that Congress intended state tort suits to 
fall outside the scope of the express pre-emption clause”).  
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IV. CONFLICT PREEMPTION 
A. Physical Impossibility 
State Ebola quarantine regulations are least likely to be superseded through 
conflict preemption that is based on a physical impossibility. Because this type of 
preemption requires a showing that state and federal laws are mutually 
exclusive, it is a rare form of preemption.171 In fact, Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul,172 the oft-cited case for preemption due to a physical 
impossibility, actually illustrates when the requirements for this type of 
preemption are not satisfied. In this case, avocado growers challenged a 
California law measuring maturity of avocados by oil content as preempted by a 
federal regulation, which provides for certification of avocado maturity without 
reference to oil content.173 Because growers could simply allow the avocados to 
mature longer on the trees to meet California’s standard, it was not impossible 
for growers to comply with California and federal standards. Consequently, the 
Court upheld the state law.174 
In the Ebola situation, there is a strong argument against finding conflict 
preemption based on a physical impossibility because state quarantine 
regulations are not mutually exclusive of federal law. The state regulations 
require asymptomatic persons who recently had contact with Ebola-infected 
persons to submit to mandatory quarantine. In contrast, federal regulation is less 
intrusive because it recommends mandatory monitoring of only a person’s 
symptoms and movements.175 States could argue that, like in Florida Lime, a 
state can impose a higher standard for quarantine regulations and not conflict 
with federal regulations because the state regulations are simply more expansive.  
B. Obstacle Preemption: Impeding a Federal Objective 
Although the states’ Ebola quarantine regulations might survive a challenge 
based on physical impossibility, state laws that complement federal law might 
nevertheless be preempted on the basis of obstacle preemption.176 In Locke, the 
 
171.  See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 608 (2013) (“It will 
rarely be ‘impossible’ to conform to both federal and state law . . . .”); Nelson, supra note 89, at 228 
n.15 (noting the Court’s infrequent use of the physical impossibility test); Young, The Ordinary Diet of 
the Law, supra note 93, at 289 (describing the impossibility doctrine as “little-used”).  
172.  373 U.S. 132 (1963).  
173.  Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 132. 
174.  Id. at 142–43 (explaining that an impossibility would have existed if the federal law 
prohibited picking avocados with more than seven percent oil and the California law required a 
minimum of eight percent oil).  
175.  Factsheet on Updated CDC Guidance: Monitoring Symptoms and Controlling Movement to 
Stop the Spread of Ebola, supra note 22.  
176.  Professor Nelson criticizes the obstacle preemption doctrine as “misplaced” because “the 
mere fact that federal law serves certain purposes does not automatically mean that it contradicts 
everything that might get in the way of those purposes.” Nelson, supra note 89, at 231–32.  
        For examples of decisions upholding state laws against an obstacle preemption challenge, see 
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009), in which the Court concluded that no obstacle preemption 
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state of Washington responded to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 by 
regulating oil tankers “regarding general navigation and watch procedures, 
English language skills, training, and casualty reporting.”177 Because of the 
similarity of its laws to federal law, the state of Washington argued that federal 
law did not preempt its regulation.178 The Court disagreed: 
It is not always a sufficient answer to a claim of pre-emption to say that 
state rules supplement, or even mirror, federal requirements. . . . The 
appropriate inquiry still remains whether the purposes and objectives 
of the federal statutes, including the intent to establish a workable, 
uniform system, are consistent with concurrent state regulation.179   
Additionally, in Hines v. Davidowitz, Pennsylvania had passed legislation 
requiring aliens to carry their alien identification cards before Congress passed 
the Alien Registration Act.180 In deciding the validity of Pennsylvania’s Alien 
Registration Act, the Court recognized congressional need for uniformity and 
held that federal law preempted the state law, notwithstanding that the state law 
 
existed because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not provide a federal remedy for unsafe drugs, 
but rather relied on available state law remedies; CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 
69, 82 (1987), in which the Court found that the state law was consistent with the purpose of the 
Federal Williams Act, which regulated tender offers; Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical 
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985), in which the Court determined that local requirements 
established for blood plasma collection by paid donors posed no interference with federal 
maintenance of a sufficient blood supply; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984), in 
which the Court perceived no conflict with the Price-Anderson Act or frustration of federal objectives 
by allowing a state award of punitive damages; and Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 512 (1983), in 
which the Court ruled that a strike replacement’s breach of contract claim against his employer did not 
frustrate the objectives of federal labor laws.  
        For examples of state laws invalidated under obstacle preemption, see Michigan Canners & 
Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 477–78 (1984), in which 
the Court held that a state law impeded the objectives of the Federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act; 
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 635 (1982), in which the Court determined that the Illinois 
Business Takeover Act frustrated the objectives of the Federal Williams Act; Fidelity Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982), in which the Court concluded that a state’s 
due-on-sale laws frustrated objectives of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s regulations by 
depriving the lender of the flexibility the Board intended to afford; McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 
234–35 (1981), in which the Court pointed out that the division of retired pay as community property 
would disrupt the federal government’s management of military personnel and its encouragement of 
orderly promotion and maintenance of youthful military; Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 589–
90 (1979), in which the Court decided that allowing the division of expected retirement payments in 
divorce proceedings would undermine the purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act; Ray v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165 (1978), in which the Court found parts of a state law regulating oil 
tankers preempted because those sections frustrated the congressional objective to have uniform 
standards for tanker design; and Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 641, 656 (1971), in which the Court 
held that because the Federal Bankruptcy Act governs discharges of judgments after bankruptcy, a 
state law that allows for suspension of a driver’s license for unpaid motor vehicle-related judgments 
previously discharged through bankruptcy conflicts with the Federal Act. 
177.  529 U.S. 89, 116 (2000).  
178.  Locke, 529 U.S. at 115.  
179.  Id.  
180.  312 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1941).  
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complemented federal law.181  
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, Massachusetts restricted state 
entities from purchasing goods and services from companies having a 
commercial relationship with Burma.182 Subsequently, Congress enacted 
legislation imposing sanctions on Burma, authorizing the President to set 
additional sanctions, and instructing the President to develop “a comprehensive, 
multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices 
and the quality of life in Burma.”183 Although the state law did not directly 
conflict with federal law and shared common goals with its federal counterpart, 
the state law was preempted.184 The Court explained, 
The fact of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means, and 
the fact that some companies may be able to comply with both sets of 
sanctions does not mean that the state Act is not at odds with 
achievement of the federal decision about the right degree of pressure 
to employ.185  
In Crosby, by restraining the President’s flexibility and discretion, the state 
law interfered with the President’s authority over economic sanctions against 
Burma.186 The Court reasoned, 
The President has been given this authority not merely to make a 
political statement but to achieve a political result, and the fullness of 
his authority shows the importance in the congressional mind of 
reaching that result. It is simply implausible that Congress would have 
gone to such lengths to empower the President if it had been willing to 
compromise his effectiveness by deference to every provision of state 
statute or local ordinance that might, if enforced, blunt the 
consequences of discretionary Presidential action.187 
Finally, the state law in Crosby “compromise[d] the very capacity of the 
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other 
governments.”188 The state law prompted several nations to directly protest the 
United States and some nations to file formal complaints against the United 
States with the World Trade Organization.189 The Court deferred to the 
executive branch in its assessment of how the state law complicated the 
congressional goal for a comprehensive multilateral strategy and concluded that 
 
181.  Hines, 312 U.S. at 73 (“And whether or not registration of aliens is of such a nature that the 
Constitution permits only of one uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the Congress might 
validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable.”).  
182.  530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).  
183.  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369.  
184.  Id. at 379.  
185.  Id. at 379–80 (internal citation omitted).  
186.  Id. at 373–74.  
187.  Id. at 376.  
188.  Id. at 381.  
189.  Id. at 382–83.  
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the state law impeded congressional diplomatic objectives.190 
1. Uniformity 
In the present case, the United States announced its four-point strategy in 
combatting Ebola as “[c]ontrolling the epidemic; [m]anaging the secondary 
consequences of the outbreak; [b]uilding coherent leadership and operations; 
and, [e]nsuring global health security.”191 State Ebola regulations could be 
preempted for interfering with a federal need to establish uniformity, maintain 
national security against the domestic spread of Ebola, and provide support to 
contain Ebola abroad.  
The need for uniformity is a central justification for preemption.192 In 
addition to the CDC, a public health emergency involves numerous federal 
agencies and departments, including the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of Transportation, Customs and Border Protection, the Food and 
Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of 
Defense.193 The multitude and many levels of government—over 87,500 local 
governmental units in the United States—make uniformity essential in federal 
governance.194 
This multiplicity of government actors below the federal level virtually 
ensures that, in the absence of federal preemption, businesses with 
national operations that serve national markets will be subject to 
 
190.  Id. at 385–86. Professor Young criticizes the Court’s premature preemption holding in 
Crosby because it allowed the “mere delegation of authority to the President to preempt state trade 
sanctions [to] signal[] that such sanctions were in conflict with federal policy, even though the 
President had not actually exercised his preemptive authority.” Ernst A. Young, Executive 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 899–900 (2008). He finds Crosby troubling because “[t]o say that 
the mere delegation of authority to act can have preemptive effect, without requiring a political 
decision to act for which the Executive may be held accountable, is to disembowel the notion of 
process federalism entirely.” Id. at 900.  
191.  The U.S. Response to the Ebola Outbreak: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 
113th Cong. (Nov. 12, 2014) (statement of Heather Higginbottom, Deputy Secretary of State for 
Management and Resources), http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/remarks/2014/233996.htm [hereinafter 
Statement of Heather Higginbottom]. The strategy has also been phrased as designed “[t]o control the 
outbreak; [t]o address the ripple effects on local economies and communities to prevent massive 
humanitarian disasters; [t]o coordinate a broader global response; and [t]o urgently build up public 
health systems in countries with few resources.” U.S. Deploying 3000 Troops to West Africa in 
Intensified Response? To Fight Ebola, RTTNEWS (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:29 AM), 
http://www.rttnews.com/2384986/us-deploying-3000-troops-to-west-africa-in-intensified-response-to-
fight-ebola.aspx. 
192.  See Davis, supra note 77, at 1016 (“The perceived need for uniformity of standards is, and 
has always been, a critical factor to the Court in evaluating whether a state law stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of federal objectives.”); Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 782 (discussing the need for 
uniformity as a compelling justification for preemption).  
193.  Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, supra note 20, at 5. For a detailed account of 
the involvement of various agencies in containing Ebola, see Memorandum from the Majority Staff, 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, supra note 24, at 
4–8.  
194.  Untereiner, supra note 117, at 1261–62.  
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complicated, overlapping, and sometimes even conflicting legal 
regimes. These overlapping regulations have the potential to impose 
onerous burdens on interstate commerce and to disrupt and undermine 
federal regulatory programs.195 
Uniformity provides predictability and efficiency for those being regulated, 
as well as for the regulators. For example, for ERISA, uniformity provides “a set 
standard” by which claims and disbursements may be processed.196 “A 
patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in 
benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans 
to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting 
them.”197 For occupational health and safety issues, Congress intended that 
employers and employees be subject to only one set of regulations, be it state or 
federal.198 In Ouellette, the Court pointed out that predictability and efficiency in 
the EPA’s permit system would have been impaired by the affected state passing 
their own regulations, which would lead to a “chaotic confrontation between 
sovereign states.”199 
For state Ebola quarantine regulations, uniformity would ensure many 
benefits. “As far back as 1851 the lack of a uniform system of quarantine laws 
was keenly felt.”200 Reacting to a cholera epidemic in 1892, New York assembled 
investigators to study New York’s quarantine.201 These investigators articulated 
the following reasons in support of a uniform federal quarantine system: 
1. As the federal government is an indispensable factor in every 
quarantine crisis, it is only by giving to the federal government 
complete control that conflicts of authority and the weakening effects 
of official jealousy can be avoided. 
2. The federal government has at command the trained men who have 
to be summoned to the help of the state in time of peril. It is better to 
have the federal government directly instead of indirectly responsible. 
3. The federal government in every crisis, through the various arms of 
the public service, is able to command an amount of expert 
 
195.  Id.  
196. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).  
197.  Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).  
198.  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992).  
199.  Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987) (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 
731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984)). With regards to legislation that takes into account federalism 
concerns, Professor Patricia Donze states that “[e]nvironmental and labor groups ‘fear the measures 
[federalism bills] would undermine federal agencies’ authority to enforce nationwide regulations and 
standards, setting back the clock on hard-won health and environmental protections.’” Donze, supra 
note 77, at 241 (quoting Ron Eckstein, Federalism Bills Unify Usual Foes, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, 
at 1). 
200.  E. H. Lewinski-Corwin, Quarantine in the Maritime Cities of the United States, 60 J. AM. 
MEDIC. ASS’N 194, 195 (1913).  
201.  Id.  
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cooperation entirely beyond the reach of a state.202  
As to the first justification articulated above, recent events illustrate the 
potential for conflicting authority—not only between the federal and state 
governments, but also among individual states. Governor Christie released Kaci 
Hickox from her mandatory quarantine, which she spent in a tent on hospital 
grounds in New Jersey.203 When she was released to return to her home in 
Maine, she was placed under quarantine in her home.204 Public health experts 
have cautioned that multiple quarantine policies among the states could confuse 
the public and healthcare workers, as well as lead to inconsistencies that 
negatively impact disease control.205 “Furthermore, governors and other elected 
officials who intercede in technical public health matters undermine public 
confidence in the CDC and state public health agencies.”206 Consequently, the 
need to reconcile the conflict between the federal and state governments over 
the allocation of authority over public health has led some policy experts to 
recommend “federalizing the rules for pandemic response, much as the 
recognition of the far-reaching and adverse effects of pollution led to federal 
environmental legislation.”207 
As to the second and third justifications, the federal government indeed has 
trained persons who can provide the necessary expertise to combat Ebola. When 
nurse Nina Pham contracted Ebola through her care for Thomas Eric Duncan, 
she was later moved to the National Institutes of Health’s hospital, a state of the 
art facility,208 where she was under the medical supervision of the nation’s 
 
202.  Id. The investigators also noted that foreign consuls would be more likely to cooperate 
with federal quarantine officials, and that “recent experiences” indicated a trend toward “international 
supervision of infectious diseases.” Id. 
203.  Gostin & Friedman, supra note 37; Prince, supra note 36. 
204.  Julia Bayly, Shayna Jacobs & Corky Siemaszko, Nurse Kaci Hickox Vows to Break New 
Ebola Quarantine Protocol in Maine, Take Issue to Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2014, 7:25 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/kaci-hickox-remains-defiant-won-follow-maine-ebola-
quarantine-article-1.1991074. 
205.  CARAFANO ET AL., supra note 7, at 21 (“State leaders exacerbated the problem by 
providing conflicting guidance. For example, the governors of New York and New Jersey issued 
quarantine orders, but others did not, leading to confusion about quarantine rules and standards.”); 
Barbisch et al., supra note 42, at 3; Bidgood & Zernike, supra note 17 (“In response, governors of both 
parties are struggling to define public health policies on the virus, leaving a confusing patchwork of 
rules regarding monitoring, restricting and quarantining health care workers who have treated Ebola 
patients, whether domestically or abroad.”).  
206.  Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, supra note 20, at 5; Rothstein, From SARS to 
Ebola, supra note 9, at 256 (stating that “[o]ther important reasons for questioning these ad hoc state 
policies include possibly undermining the CDC’s credibility and confusing the public by having 
different quarantine policies in each state.”).  
207.  STANLEY M. LEMON, MARAGRET A. HAMBURG, P. FREDERICK SPARLING, EILEEN R. 
CHOFFNES & ALISON MACK, ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MITIGATING PANDEMIC 
DISEASE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 18–19 (2007) (citing Vitoria Sutton, Director of the Center for 
Bioterrorism, Law, and Public Policy at Texas Tech University, and Shelley Hearne of Johns Hopkins 
University).  
208.  Nina Pham Moving from Texas for Ebola Treatment, CBS (Oct. 16, 2014, 10:43 AM), 
http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2014/10/16/nina-pham-moving-from-texas-for-ebola-treatment/; Press Release, 
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experts who later cured her.209 Additionally, the federal government’s expertise 
makes it better equipped and informed to formulate national guidelines for 
fighting Ebola. The CDC guidelines, which do not include mandatory 
quarantining of asymptomatic persons,210 have been described as “sensible, . . . 
based on science . . . [and] crafted in consultation with the people who are 
actually going there [to Africa] to do the work.”211 Thus, for the reasons 
articulated by the New York Assembly, the federal government could desire 
uniform standards for Ebola quarantine regulations, and therefore state 
quarantine laws could be preempted for thwarting national uniformity. 
2. National Security and Global Response to Contain Ebola  
In addition to the need for uniformity, state Ebola quarantines could 
interfere with other federal objectives—particularly the President’s plan to fight 
Ebola. The United States has taken the lead in initiating a global response 
against Ebola,212 and President Obama has prioritized Ebola as a national 
security concern,213 as evidenced by his announcement: “We have to work 
together at every level—federal, state and local. And we have to keep leading 
the global response, because the best way to stop this disease, the best way to 
keep Americans safe, is to stop it at its source—in West Africa.”214  
State-mandated quarantines could interfere with the United States’ national 
security and global response in a number of ways. First, national security would 
be compromised if Ebola spreads.215 Mandatory quarantines risk deterring 
others from reporting symptoms or information about their recent contact with 
 
Nat’l Insts. of Health, Texas Nurse Free of Ebola Virus; Discharged from NIH Clinical Center (Oct. 
24, 2014), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/oct2014/od-24a.htm. 
209.  Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 208.  
210.  Factsheet on Updated CDC Guidance: Monitoring Symptoms and Controlling Movement to 
Stop the Spread of Ebola, supra note 22. 
211.  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on American Health Care Workers 
Fighting Ebola (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/29/remarks-
president-american-health-care-workers-fighting-ebola [hereinafter Statement of President Obama]. 
212.  Statement of Heather Higginbottom, supra note 191 (“The U.S. has taken a lead role in 
managing the global response in Liberia. We are working with the UK and France as they assume 
larger roles in Sierra Leone and Guinea, respectively.”).  
213.  Rose Gottemoeller, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Security, Remarks at 
University of Virginia, Jefferson Literary and Debating Society: Biosecurity in the Time of Ebola 
(Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.state.gov/t/us/2015/237560.htm (“President Obama has made it clear that 
‘fighting this [Ebola] epidemic is a national security priority for the United States’ and that world 
leaders needed to increase efforts to counter a wide range of biological threats, ‘from infections that 
are resistant to antibiotics to terrorists that seek to develop and use biological weapons.’”). 
214.  President Obama Provides an Update on the U.S.-Led Response to Ebola, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ebola-response (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (quoting President Barack 
Obama and providing an overview of the Obama administration’s “global response” and coordinating 
domestic efforts against Ebola).  
215.  Statement of Heather Higginbottom, supra note 191 (“As President Obama said, ‘If we 
don’t make that effort now, and this spreads not just through Africa but other parts of the world[,] . . . 
it could be a serious danger to the United States.’” (omission in original)).  
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someone infected with Ebola.216 If such persons fail to report this information, 
their conditions would not be monitored, and they risk infecting others. 
Moreover, mandatory quarantines could lead to the negative unintended 
consequence of spreading the disease in yet another way. 
 Another risk associated with quarantine is the unintended impact on 
patients admitted to the hospital for other medical problems. Patients 
with acute coronary syndromes, strokes, cancer, and traumatic injuries 
were all subjected to confinement. In addition, the perceived benefit of 
confining medical personnel to the hospital did not guarantee that 
patients would be provided with timely and quality medical care. 
 In the case of SARS, patients with multiple diagnoses were cross 
contaminated within the crowded hospital, adding to their health risks. 
In the case of Ebola, patients with malaria and dengue fever may be 
confined with Ebola patients. Given the risk, the benefit of this 
strategy may not outweigh the health risk to the large number of 
individuals affected.217 
Second, because the individuals who have recently traveled to an Ebola-
infected country are predominantly healthcare workers,218 state-mandated 
quarantines risk stigmatizing them.219 The scientific community agrees that the 
twenty-one-day quarantine is not grounded in science and could stymie efforts to 
stop Ebola at its source.220 Researchers conclude that “[a]symptomatic persons 
do not spread Ebola, therefore such actions are not scientifically supported.”221 
The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology in America and the Infectious 
Diseases Society of America, “two authoritative bodies within the United 
States,” oppose mandatory quarantine of asymptomatic health workers and are 
concerned that “[t]his approach carries unintended negative consequences 
without significant additional benefits.”222 The CDC’s more flexible Ebola 
quarantine policies have also garnered support from the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists, which “represent[s] the nation’s ‘disease detectives’ 
 
216.  McKay et al., supra note 22 (reporting CDC Director’s concern about healthcare workers’ 
concealment of prior contact with Ebola patients due to fear of quarantines).  
217.  See Barbisch et al., supra note 42, at 8.  
218.  Statement of President Obama, supra note 211 (“Keep in mind that of the seven 
Americans treated for Ebola so far, most of them while serving in West Africa, all seven have 
survived.”).  
219.  CSTE Urges States to Heed CDC’s Ebola Quarantine Guidance, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 28, 
2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cste-urges-states-to-heed-cdcs-ebola-quarantine-
guidance-280674052.html (“Recent decisions by governors to enforce quarantines on health 
professionals and other individuals returning from Ebola-affected countries in West Africa are not 
rooted in science and provide a serious disincentive for health professionals to fight this disease at its 
source.”).  
220.  See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029 
(2014).  
221.  E.g., Barbisch et al., supra note 42, at 3. 
222.  Id. (quoting IDSA Statement on Involuntary Quarantine of Healthcare Workers Returning 
from Ebola-Affected Countries, IDSA, http://www.idsociety.org/2014_ebola_quarantine/#sthash. 
NPEyXnPE.dpuf (last visited by Barbisch et al. Nov. 8, 2014)). 
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working on the frontlines to stop Ebola.”223 
Third, the stigma could, in turn, discourage health workers from returning 
to Africa to provide additional aid and new volunteers from traveling to Africa 
as part of the relief effort.224 Researchers conclude, “Hundreds of years of 
experience show that to stop an epidemic of this type requires controlling it at its 
source.”225 In order to stop Ebola at its source, organizations such as Médecins 
sans Frontières, the World Health Organization, and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development have estimated that “tens of thousands of additional 
volunteers” are needed,226 and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim estimated 
that as many as 5,000 health workers are needed, a need that has largely gone 
unmet.227 To make matters worse, beside the heightened need for health 
workers, health workers have suffered the greatest casualties, with as many as 
443 infected cases and 244 deaths among health workers.228 
The decisions by the states, White House officials and others warned, 
could hamstring the effort to staff up to 17 Ebola treatment units that 
American military personnel are building in Liberia. American health 
officials had already been facing the difficult task of finding volunteers, 
and have accepted help from foreign nationals, including Cuba, to aid 
the effort.229  
President Obama expressed his concerns: 
[W]e have to keep in mind that if we’re discouraging our health care 
workers, who are prepared to make these sacrifices, from traveling to 
these places in need, then we’re not doing our job in terms of looking 
after our own public health and safety. What we are—what we need 
right now is these shock troops who are out there leading globally. We 
can’t discourage that; we’ve got to encourage it and applaud it.230 
A report shows that “[m]isapplication of quarantine guidelines to asymptomatic 
individuals resulted in fewer volunteers deploying to support the Ebola outbreak 
 
223.  CSTE Urges States to Heed CDC’s Ebola Quarantine Guidance, supra note 219.  
224.  Statement of President Obama, supra note 211. The media, such as CNN, have also 
reported the Executive’s concerns with state quarantines:  
After visiting a group of health care workers who’d recently returned from the epicenter of 
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa—some still within the virus’s 21-day incubation period, 
but showing no symptoms—Obama said policies like states requiring three-week 
quarantines of doctors and nurses who treated Ebola patients could harm U.S. efforts to stop 
its spread. 
Eric Bradner, Obama Hits Governors for ‘Hiding Under the Covers’ from Ebola, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 
29, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/29/politics/obama-ebola-hiding/index.html.  
225.  E.g., Drazen et al., supra note 220, at 2029. 
226.  Id.  
227.  Lauren Vogel, Call for Ebola Medics Falls on Deaf Ears: MSF, 186 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N 
J. E669, E669 (2014).  
228.  Id.  
229.  Flegenheimer et al., supra note 15.  
230.  Statement of President Obama, supra note 211.  
   
2015] UNDER CONTAINMENT 33 
 
owing to concerns about restrictions upon their return.”231 For example, Ryan 
Boyko, a student at the Yale University School of Public Health, was 
quarantined by order of Connecticut’s Governor upon returning from West 
Africa as a healthcare volunteer, and commented that such quarantines would 
discourage health workers from volunteering.232 Beyond discouraging 
volunteers, the states’ quarantine policies disable health workers because “[i]f 
everyone who cares for an Ebola patient must be quarantined for a long period 
of time, we may run out of new workers.”233 Because there is currently no 
vaccine for Ebola, the only means of stopping the spread of Ebola is through the 
provision of health services to the affected, which relies more than ever on the 
availability of health workers.234 Therefore, although states might defend their 
Ebola quarantine regulations as supplementing federal regulations, state law 
could still be preempted for frustrating federal objectives.  
V. FIELD PREEMPTION 
A. Pervasive Federal Scheme 
Even if state Ebola quarantine regulations were to survive a challenge 
based on obstacle preemption, they could be preempted through field 
preemption. States could argue that their quarantine laws are harmonious with 
federal regulations. But this argument is of no avail when the inquiry concerns 
field preemption because the Court has consistently construed the field 
preemption doctrine to override state laws that “‘curtail or complement’ federal 
law or . . . ‘enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.’”235 The Court has 
unequivocally prohibited states from “enter[ing], in any respect, an area the 
Federal Government has reserved for itself.”236 
 
231.  Barbisch et al., supra note 42, at 3 (citing Christie Duffy, Ebola Volunteers Down After 
Quarantine Rules Imposed, NJTV NEWS (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.njtvonline.org/news/video/ 
groups-blame-ebola-quarantine-for-fewer-volunteers/).  
232.  Lips, supra note 16.  
233.  Id. (quoting Zita Lazzarini, University of Connecticut professor).  
234.  See Casey, supra note 1, at 24. Several vaccines have been developed but are still in the 
investigational phase. Memorandum from the Majority Staff, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, supra note 24, at 3; Press Release, Office of the White 
House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Update on the Ebola Response (Dec. 2, 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/02/fact-sheet-update-ebola-response [hereinafter 
White House Press Release on the Ebola Response].  
235.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 66–67 (1940)); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984).  
236.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. For an additional example of field preemption invalidating 
state law, see Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983), in which the Court held that the Federal 
Gas Act occupied the field of “wholesale sales of natural gas in interstate commerce.” 462 U.S. 176, 
184 (1983).  
For examples of circumstances where the Court has upheld state law against a field preemption 
challenge, see California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), in which the 
Court found that state law employment practices favoring pregnant women were not preempted by 
Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
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Arizona v. United States provides the most current example of both species 
of field preemption.237 Arizona passed an immigration bill, Arizona Senate Bill 
1070, which criminalized noncompliance with federal alien-registration 
requirements238 and the seeking of employment by unauthorized aliens.239 It 
authorized police officers to arrest anyone, without a warrant but with probable 
cause, believed to be removable240 and required officers to verify an arrestee’s 
immigration status with the federal government.241 The Court concluded that the 
“extensive[ness] and complex[ity]”242 of federal legislation governing 
immigration carved out immigration law as federal domain.243 Congress’s 
dominancy was made clear by its passage of a vast array of immigration 
legislation, defining lawful entry and federal crimes,244 registration 
requirements,245 public benefits,246 and sanctions on employers.247 Congress’s 
authority to make uniform laws for naturalization, as conferred by Article I, 
Section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution, further buttressed congressional 
governance over immigration.248  
Of course, whether the federal government successfully exerts field 
preemption depends on how narrowly or broadly the field is defined.249 Looking 
broadly, the Court in Arizona defined the field as encompassing “immigration 
 
238, 239 (1984), in which the Court concluded that the Price-Anderson Act did not preempt a state 
court’s award of punitive damages for a laboratory analyst’s injuries resulting from plutonium 
contamination; Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54, 
468 U.S. 491, 502 (1984), in which the Court stated that the National Labor Relations Act neither 
contained any indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of labor-management 
relations nor preempted state regulation of union officials’ qualifications; Michigan Canners & 
Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984), in which the 
Court found that the Federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act did not preempt state laws also regulating 
agricultural product marketing.  
237.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492.  
238.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2010), invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492 (2012).  
239.  Id. § 13-2928, invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
240.  Id. § 13-3883(A)(5), invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
241.  Id. § 11-1051, invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
242.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.  
243. Id. at 2501–02.  
244.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 (2012).  
245.  See id. §§ 1301–1306.  
246.  See id. § 1622.  
247.  See id. § 1324(a).  
248.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.  
249.  See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (defining ERISA’s 
preemption provision narrowly to encompass only state laws relating to employee benefit plans, rather 
than simply benefits, and consequently upholding state severance pay law); Young, The Ordinary Diet 
of the Law, supra note 93, at 336 (“In most cases, the relevant ‘field’ can be characterized in multiple 
ways.”).  
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and alien status”250 and concluded that Congress intended to occupy this field.251 
Even when it focused on each of the contested provisions of Arizona’s 
legislation, narrowing the field from “immigration” to “alien registration,” the 
Court nonetheless found field preemption.252 
In the present case, states have a greater likelihood of successfully 
defending their Ebola quarantine regulations against the type of field 
preemption that is based on a pervasive federal scheme. Defined narrowly, the 
Public Health Service Act can be construed as regulating the field of quarantine, 
which is unlikely to satisfy the Court’s definition of a pervasive scheme. Even 
construing the Federal Public Health Service Act broadly as regulating 
communicable diseases, the Act does not have nearly the same breadth as 
federal immigration legislation. 
The federal government might argue that the CDC regulations controlling 
communicable diseases are comprehensive and demonstrate a pervasive federal 
scheme. But that argument would be ineffective because the Court looks to the 
pervasiveness of the federal legislation—not the comprehensiveness of the 
federal regulation—to identify field preemption.253 In Hillsborough County v. 
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., the Court explicitly “reject[ed] the 
argument that an intent to pre-empt [could] be inferred from the 
comprehensiveness of the FDA’s regulations.”254 As the Court explained, 
 We are even more reluctant to infer pre-emption from the 
comprehensiveness of regulations than from the comprehensiveness of 
statutes. As a result of their specialized functions, agencies normally 
deal with problems in far more detail than does Congress. To infer pre-
emption whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively is 
virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides 
to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive.255 
Therefore, unless an agency is explicit about whether its regulation has 
preemptive effect, the Court will “pause before” concluding that “the mere 
volume and complexity of [an agency’s] regulations indicate that the agency did 
in fact intend to pre-empt.”256 A subject matter’s complexity will necessarily 
entail a comprehensive federal scheme and, therefore, cannot be the sole 
indicator of congressional intent to exclude state laws: “Given the complexity of 
 
250.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. Whether immigration is an exclusively federal field is debated. 
Some scholars point out that there is not an express grant of authority to Congress over immigration. 
See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 171, at 611.  
251.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
252.  Id. at 2502–03.  
253.  See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1973) 
(relying on a provision in section 1108(a) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a), that 
declared “[t]he United States of America . . . possess[es] and exercise[s] complete and exclusive 
national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States . . . ." to find preemption regarding aircraft 
noise).  
254.  471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985).  
255.  Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 717 (emphasis added).  
256.  Id. at 718.  
   
36 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
the matter addressed by Congress . . . , a detailed statutory scheme was both 
likely and appropriate, completely apart from any questions of pre-emptive 
intent.”257 Consequently, state Ebola quarantine regulations are likely protected 
against the type of field preemption that is based on a pervasive federal scheme. 
B. Dominant Federal Interest 
Although state Ebola quarantine regulations might withstand an attack 
based on a claim of a pervasive federal scheme, they are unlikely to do so under 
a field preemption attack grounded on a dominant federal interest. At first 
blush, it appears the states would have a strong argument to defend against a 
claim of a dominant federal interest in quarantine regulation. In Hillsborough 
County, the Court declined to find that the Public Health Service Act preempted 
a local ordinance regulating the collection of blood plasma from paid donors 
simply because of a federal interest.258 In that instance, the Court discounted the 
significance of a dominant federal interest: 
Undoubtedly, every subject that merits congressional legislation is, by 
definition, a subject of national concern. That cannot mean, however, 
that every federal statute ousts all related state law. Neither does the 
Supremacy Clause require us to rank congressional enactments in 
order of “importance” and hold that, for those at the top of the scale, 
federal regulation must be exclusive.259 
Hillsborough County, however, is not analogous because it lacked an element of 
foreign affairs that is present in the current situation, which would make state 
Ebola regulations vulnerable. 
The area of foreign affairs is uniquely situated among the fields that enjoy 
exclusive federal control. The Court has given great deference to federal 
prerogatives in foreign affairs, announcing that “[o]ur system of government is 
such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of 
the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the 
field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.”260 
One of the strongest pronouncements of federal foreign affairs powers 
appears in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.261 In that case, Congress 
authorized President Franklin Roosevelt to issue an arms embargo on countries 
involved in the Chaco conflict,262 which was challenged as an invalid delegation 
of power to the executive branch.263 Curtiss-Wright delineated the scope of 
foreign affairs as resting exclusively within the federal sphere, tracing the 
transmission of that power from Great Britain to the national government when 
 
257.  DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359–60 (1976) (quoting N.Y. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. 
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973)).  
258.  471 U.S. at 719.  
259.  Id.  
260.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).  
261.  299 U.S. 304 (1936).  
262.  Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 312.  
263.  Id. at 314.  
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the colonies ceded from the Crown.264 As a result, the Court explains, the 
individual states never possessed international powers.265 Moreover, the power 
to negotiate with foreign countries lies solely with the President: 
[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation. . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate 
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. . . . “The 
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its 
sole representative with foreign nations.”266 
Although Curtiss-Wright did not involve preemption, subsequent 
preemption cases have recognized the President’s plenary power in foreign 
affairs as a foundation for preempting state law.267 In Zschernig v. Miller, 
Oregon’s probate law concerning nonresident aliens’ claim to personal or real 
property was preempted because it intruded upon federal prerogatives in foreign 
policy.268 Specifically, the state law conditioned inheritance by a nonresident 
alien upon a showing that his home country would not confiscate the property 
and would provide reciprocal rights of inheritance for Americans.269 The Court 
held that “state action with more than incidental effect on foreign affairs is 
preempted, even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject area of the 
 
264.  Id. at 316–17. 
265.  Id. at 316.  
266.  Id. at 319 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. John Marshall)).  
267.  One criticism that can be lodged against preemption predicated on federal dominance in 
foreign affairs is that globalization increases the interconnectivity of foreign and domestic activities, 
making it difficult to distinguish between the two. Professor Goldsmith points out,  
As the world becomes more interconnected—as international law increasingly regulates 
traditional “local” issues, as the category of “foreign affairs” expands to include traditional 
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influence of external activities on local communities—this overlap in the canons will only 
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Goldsmith, supra note 93, at 196 (footnote omitted); see also, Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, 
Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 141 (2001) 
(“[I]t is no longer possible in an age of globalization to draw a bright line between ‘foreign’ and 
‘domestic’ affairs.”). Professor Goldsmith provides several examples where a matter concerning 
foreign affairs can be framed as an intrusion into state traditional police power: Angel Breard’s 
execution, rather than viewing it as implicating an alien’s rights, was essentially an exercise of state 
police power over criminal punishment for murder; the dispute over unpaid New York parking tickets 
by foreign diplomats involved the state’s power over traffic violations, rather than diplomatic 
immunity; and California’s method of calculating corporate franchise tax based on a worldwide 
combined reporting was a state tax issue, rather than foreign commerce. Goldsmith, supra note 93, at 
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state law, and hence without any showing of conflict.”270 Thereby, the Court 
conceived of the President’s “dormant foreign affairs power.”271 
In Arizona, the Court was sensitive to the potential effects of Arizona’s law 
on foreign policy, noting, “It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned 
about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must 
be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, 
not the 50 separate States.”272 The Court recognized the federal government’s 
“inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign 
nations,”273 recounting the Framers’ support of federal power for fear that 
“‘bordering States . . . under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense 
of apparent interest or injury’ might take action that would undermine foreign 
relations.”274  
Also, the Court in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi relied on the 
foreign affairs power and a dominant federal interest to preempt state law.275 In 
that case, California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act required insurers 
to disclose information regarding policies sold in Europe from 1920 to 1945.276 
The federal government, having established a system for Holocaust-era 
insurance claims to be processed by the German Foundation in conjunction with 
the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims,277 grew 
concerned over the impact of California’s law on the federally negotiated 
system.278 The Court concluded that the state law undermined the President’s 
discretion to use “economic pressure” as a “tool of diplomacy.”279 The Court 
reiterated the federal government’s prerogative over foreign affairs: 
There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state 
power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National 
Government’s policy, given the “concern for uniformity in this 
country’s dealings with foreign nations” that animated the 
Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the National 
Government in the first place.280  
The Court declared, “Although the source of the President’s power to act in 
 
270.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418 (2003). 
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foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the 
‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the 
President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign 
relations.’”281 Additionally, the Court recognized presidential power to make 
executive agreements with foreign countries, which are effective without 
congressional approval.282 The Court pointed out that had the President issued 
an executive agreement that expressly preempted state regulation in Garamendi, 
the Court would have straightforwardly applied the general recognition that 
executive agreements can preempt state law.283 Due to the lack of an express 
preemption provision, the Court relied on interference with foreign affairs as a 
basis for invoking field preemption to invalidate California’s law.284 
Moreover, even areas of state traditional police powers may implicate 
foreign affairs and be susceptible to preemption through a dominant federal 
interest. In McCarty v. McCarty, a federal interest prevailed over the state’s 
traditional prerogatives in family law.285 In that case, the state community 
property law allowed for military retired pay to be divided in a divorce 
proceeding. The Court identified a federal interest in maintaining a “youthful 
and vigorous” military to preclude application of the state’s community property 
law.286 The federal interest dominated in McCarty because federal authority to 
maintain a military force is grounded in the Constitution’s grant to Congress287 
“[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces.”288 
 
281.  Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 
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Similarly, in United States v. Locke, the Court concluded that the Federal 
Oil Pollution Act preempted Washington’s law regulating oil tankers.289 
Arguably, the state of Washington’s regulations were within its traditional police 
powers to regulate health and safety, as the regulations endeavored to prevent 
oil spills by providing “the best achievable protection . . . from damages caused 
by the discharge of oil.”290 Rather than focusing on state police powers, the 
Court construed the state of Washington’s regulations as interfering with 
traditional federal powers—interstate navigation and maritime trade.291 
The above cases demonstrate that “the President possesses extraordinary 
powers to preempt state law affecting foreign relations on his own constitutional 
authority and his authority delegated by Congress.”292 In the present situation, 
the President could assert his foreign affairs powers to preempt state Ebola 
quarantine regulations because they arguably impair U.S. efforts to provide 
support to Africa. As previously discussed, the United States has led the fight 
against Ebola overseas by deploying nearly 3,000 service members to West 
Africa293 and committing $350 million, with an additional request from the 
Department of Defense and U.S. Agency for International Development for 
$2.89 billion from Congress.294 The effect state regulations could have on our 
domestic and international response to Ebola makes it a dominant federal 
interest. President Obama made the following statement in his address about 
fighting Ebola: “I said this at the U.N. General Assembly—when disease or 
disaster strikes anywhere in the world, the world calls us. And the reason they 
call us is because of the men and women like the ones who are here today 
[referring to Ebola healthcare workers].”295 The United States’ leadership role in 
the fight against Ebola is evident from the White House’s report that it 
“[g]alvaniz[ed] international support for the response, which has resulted in 
more than $2 billion in commitments since mid-September.”296 State quarantine 
regulations could compromise the United States’ position in the international 
community and its diplomatic relations. If the United States is unable to rally 
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health workers to volunteer for fear of being quarantined, how can the United 
States call upon other nations to join the fight against Ebola? Because we lead, 
and are depended upon by other nations to lead, state Ebola regulations could 
be voided through field preemption. 
Thus far, this Article has argued that an anti-preemption clause, standing 
alone, is insufficient to immunize state Ebola regulations. And it has argued that 
the foreign affairs power can preempt state legislation, even when facing state 
traditional police powers. The final question that remains is which law prevails 
when an anti-preemption clause or saving clause collides with executive foreign 
affairs policy? Garamendi provides a clue as to what the answer might be.  
In Garamendi, California argued that despite its interference with the 
Executive’s foreign relations, its law was authorized under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act’s anti-preemption clause.297 The Court interpreted the McCarran-
Ferguson Act as Congress’s self-imposed limitation of its commerce power to 
allow states to regulate insurance within their borders, but it was not necessarily 
a limit on executive foreign affairs powers: “[A] federal statute directed to 
implied preemption by domestic commerce legislation cannot sensibly be 
construed to address preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs.”298 
Therefore, the President’s assertion of the foreign affairs power could overcome 
the anti-preemption provision in the Public Health Service Act and invalidate 
state Ebola quarantine regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is not to take a position regarding the 
implementation of quarantines. But if quarantines are ineffective, then the 
federal government will want to override state quarantine laws. Public health 
experts have argued against Ebola quarantines because asymptomatic persons 
are not contagious. If state quarantines should be superseded, one mechanism to 
achieve that would be through preemption. 
Ordinarily, state laws over health and safety enjoy a presumption against 
preemption, but the Court has not hesitated to set aside state law when it 
interferes with or conflicts with federal law or prerogatives. For the same reason, 
the anti-preemption clause in section 264 of the Public Health Service Act 
cannot shield state quarantine laws from preemption when there is a conflict 
with federal law. 
Since neither the presumption against preemption nor state police powers 
are sufficient barriers against preemption, the federal government could employ 
obstacle and field preemption to override state quarantine regulations, arguing 
that they frustrate federal objectives and there is a dominant federal interest in 
containing Ebola. State regulations impede the establishment of uniformity for 
quarantine regulations, which is essential to the containment of any disease, 
because multiple regulations can cause confusion and inconsistent responses. 
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Imposing a mandatory quarantine on asymptomatic persons who are not 
contagious deters healthcare workers from volunteering and disables healthcare 
workers who are under quarantine. The result is that fewer healthcare workers 
are available to provide aid in West Africa and to prevent the epidemic from 
spreading to the United States, which in turn threatens national security. State 
quarantine regulations interfere with the President’s foreign affairs prerogative 
and commitment to aid West Africa. Preempting state law could protect the lives 
of those in Ebola-affected countries by removing state laws that stigmatize 
healthcare workers and discourage them from participating in the battle against 
Ebola. Thus, the containment of state Ebola quarantine regulations could 
contribute to the containment of Ebola worldwide. 
 
